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Brown H: Ordinary Remedies for
Extraordinary Wrongs
James E. Pfander*
During events that marked the fiftieth anniversary of Brown
v. Board of Education' (Brown I) in 2004, legal scholars and
commentators offered a mixed assessment of the decision's impact
on public schools in the United States. Scholars often celebrated
Brown rs promise of equal justice as an enduring contribution to
constitutional law.' But anniversary accounts also described the
many stumbling blocks that efforts to integrate American schools
had faced in the last fifty years.' At many anniversary gettogethers, scholars concluded that Brown T's promise was one the
nation had yet to fulfill.4
Part of the blame for the failure of Brown I has been assigned
to the so-called remedial phase of the Court's decision, Brown I.
Instead of requiring immediate desegregation, or setting a
timetable for the attainment of concrete results, the Court simply
sent the cases back down with a directive that the district courts
oversee compliance of Brown I "with all deliberate speed."6 The
lack of specificity may have encouraged Southern intransigence,
just as it may have enabled the Court to insist on a principle that

Prentice Marshall Professor of Law, University of Illinois College
of Law.
Thanks to the University of Minnesota and its deans, Alex Johnson and Jim Chen,
for the invitation to participate in the conference. Thanks as well to my fellow
conferees for comments on the paper and to my colleagues at Illinois, Jim
Anderson, Dave Meyer, Larry Parker, and Daria Roithmayr, for the many helpful
conversations we had about Brown I in connection with our own anniversary
celebration.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. E.g., Darlene Clark Hine, The Briggs v. Elliot Legacy: Black Culture,
Consciousness, and Community Before Brown, 1930-1954, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
1054 (2004).
3. E.g., Nathaniel R. Jones, The Judicial Betrayal of Blacks-Again: The
Supreme Court's Destruction of the Hopes Raised by Brown v. Board of Education,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 109 (2004).
4. For a sampling of the anniversary literature, see Hine, supra note 2; Jones,
supra note 3; Boyce F. Martin, Jr., Fifty Years Later: It's Time to Mend Brown's
Broken Promise, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1203 (2004).
5. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
6. Id. at 301.
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it lacked the administrative capacity to enforce.7 In any case, the
Court essentially got out of the desegregation business in 1955 and
did not re-enter the field until several years passed during which
the South made little progress.! Even today, Brown 11 stands as
something of a monument to the principle that judicial opinions do
not necessarily change the world.
Somewhat in contrast to the experience with school
desegregation after Brown 1I, the Court's decision in Loving v.
Virginia9 actually did change the world, at least as the Court had
defined it. In Loving, the Court ruled that the principle of equal
protection prohibited Virginia and fifteen other Southern states
from criminalizing interracial marriages. 1° By all accounts, the
decision accomplished its goals. Although the states in question
may not have immediately repealed their anti-miscegenation laws,
prosecutions and the denial of marriage licenses to those of
different races seem to have ended. Indeed, in contrast to school
desegregation, where a steady stream of decisions have been
issued in an effort to implement Brown I, Loving generated very
little subsequent litigation. Life for interracial couples in the postLoving South still required a special form of courage, but the
Court's decision succeeded in de-criminalizing the relationship.
In this Essay, I explore the lessons of the Court's divergent
remedial schemes in Brown II and Loving. Part I explores the
Brown 11 decision and the factors that moved the Court to adopt a
deliberate speed formula that both anticipated and invited
Southern resistance. Part II looks at the Loving decision and the
Court's comparative success in making that decision stick. Part
7. Southerners had argued that the Court should not impose any affirmative
obligations in Brown 11 and should recognize that it would take time to come into
compliance. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 300
(2001). Many in the South regarded Brown 11 as a victory. Id. at 300. For an
overview of what followed, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE (1969).
8. On the absence of any noticeable integration in the South during the first
decade following the decision, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
9. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). On the origins of the Virginia anti-miscegenation laws
that the Court invalidated in Loving, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K.
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and InterracialSex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum
Virginia,77 GEO. L.J. 1967 (1989).
10. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (finding states' laws prohibiting interracial
marriage unconstitutional).
11. See, e.g., Brown 1I, 349 U.S. at 294; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992);
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (demonstrating the litigation over public
schools and desegregation in the wake of Brown II).
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III examines the changes in the law of federal court remedies for
constitutional violations in the years since Brown I came down. If
remedial weakness enabled the Court to reach its decision in
Brown I, then paradoxically, the principle of equality that the
Court articulated in 1954 has helped to foster an impressive
expansion of the remedial capacity of the federal courts. Other
analyses have focused on the structural injunction as an
extraordinary form of relief to implement school desegregation
obligations. Part III focuses instead on remedies that now make
up a part of the ordinary remedial arsenal of the federal courts,
and leave state and local governments much less room to
maneuver in seeking to skirt their constitutional obligations.
I. Brown II and All Deliberate Speed
Many observers have commented upon the Court's failure to
secure school integration in the wake of its Brown decisions. Some
view the Court's failure as evidence that the Supreme Court
cannot implement significant social change through a judicial
decree.12 On this account, only a change in society itself, perhaps
buttressed with the support of the legislative branch, can make a
significant difference on large questions of social policy."3 Others
view the Court's failure as one of will." Believers in this analysis
think that Brown I was rightly decided, stating that an enduring
principle of equality, but that the Court declined to do the hard
work necessary to deliver on that promise." For these observers,
the Court betrayed the promise of Brown I by failing to insist on
Southern compliance; 6 by failing to address de facto segregation in
the North; by treating the suburbs and cities as distinct polities for
integration purposes; 7 by failing to deal with the enormous
financial disparities between school districts; 8 and by winking at
these failures in recent decisions to approve the termination of
federal judicial oversight. 9 In the end, both groups of observers

12. See ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 47-54 (discussing the comparative
contributions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal
government to desegregating public schools).
13. Id. at 62.
14. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 8 (arguing that the Brown decision did
more to mobilize White resistance to desegregation than to further the Civil Rights
Movement).
15. Id. at 354-55.
16. Id. at 350.
17. Id. at 348.
18. Id. at 351-52.
19. Id. at 356.
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agree that the Court did not deliver the goods.
Those who participated in the Supreme Court's decision of
the remedial phase of the Brown litigation clearly anticipated
some of what actually occurred later on. 20 That is, the lawyers and
Justices all foresaw a period of sharp Southern intransigence and
a refusal on the part of school boards to implement the school
desegregation requirement.2' In front of the Supreme Court,
lawyers for South Carolina admitted that the "white people" of the
South would not send their children to "Negro schools."22
Segregation was deeply ingrained, the lawyers explained, and the
Court could not simply demand that it be changed immediately. 2
In response, Chief Justice Warren mused aloud that the plaintiffs
might have to wait until 2045-a date ninety years in the futureif they were obliged to wait for Southern attitudes to change.24
Similar if less drastic predictions were not uncommon. Justice
Black reported at the Court's conference that his law clerk did not
expect integrated schools to appear in his home town in Alabama
for at least a generation.2' Meanwhile, lawyers from Virginia
explained to the Court in some detail the array of tactics that
Southern school boards and governments could use to put off full
compliance. 2
In the face of Southern hostility, the Court temporized.
Instead of announcing a specific timetable for desegregation, or
setting forth parameters by which progress towards desegregation
might be measured, the Court sent the cases back to the lower
courts with an oxymoronic directive: the lower courts were to
admit the African-American plaintiffs to the public schools on a
racially nondiscriminatory basis, and were to do so with "all
deliberate speed. 2' The formulation, a favorite of Justice Felix
20. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CML RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 63-64 (2001) (noting the inclusion of the
deliberate speed formula in the government's amicus brief in Brown I and
describing Justice Jackson's concern that the end of segregation would flood the
Court with a series of follow-up decisions).
21. Id.
22. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE STORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 732 (Vintage Books
2004) (1975).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 736. At the time of Chief Justice Warren's comment in 1955, it had
been nearly ninety years since the Fourteenth Amendment became law in 1868. Id.
25. Id. at 743.
26. Id. at 736 (noting that local assemblies might "refuse to vote the money,
refuse to support the necessary laws, and repeal public attendance laws" in
response to court instructions).
27. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I/), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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Frankfurter, had originated in a Holmes opinion dealing with the
intransigence of the West Virginia legislature in refusing to
appropriate funds to pay a judgment. 2 Although the formulation's
origins in English Chancery remain somewhat obscure, the phrase
first appeared in the brief of the United States as amicus curiae in
the Brown litigation. 2' The concept may have originated with
Philip Elman-a former law clerk to Justice Frankfurter and an
attorney in the Solicitor General's office.3" Elman later claimed
that the phrase made an important contribution to the resolution
of the Brown controversy."
As Elman describes the problem, the Court had been sharply
divided about whether to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson.32 Chief
Justice Fred Vinson did not want to overturn the old decision, and
he could apparently count on the support of two or three other
Justices in reaffirming Plessy." Such a division would produce,
according to Justice Frankfurter, a fractured Court and a godawful mess. 4 Vinson's death during the summer of 1953, and the
appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice, opened the way for a
unanimous decision to overturn Plessy. Elman recalls that Justice
Frankfurter pungently described Vinson's death as the only "solid
piece of evidence" he had seen of the existence of God. 35 Elman
ultimately agreed with Frankfurter's assessment: the winning
formula was "God plus 'all deliberate speed.'" 6 Deliberate speed,
28. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 222 U.S. 17, 20; see also KLUGER, supra note
22, at 745-46 (accounting the origins of the term).
29. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 746.
30. See Philip Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter,and
Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817, 827
(1987) [hereinafter Elman History] (describing Elman's contribution of the
"deliberate speed" formula to the federal government's amicus brief as one of the
proudest acts of his career).
31. But cf. Randall Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938
(1987) (criticizing Elman for having exaggerated his own role in the desegregation
cases, and for having downplayed the contributions of Thurgood Marshall and the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. See Elman History, supra note 30, at 824 (describing Frankfurter's view
that the Court might muster only a 5-4 vote to overturn Plessy during Vinson's
tenure as Chief Justice). Based on subsequent developments, it appears that
Justices Jackson and Reed would have joined Vinson, and perhaps Justice Clark.
See id. at 829; see also POWE, supra note 7, at 23 (describing the Court as closely
divided following the initial argument in 1952: Black, Douglas, Burton and Minton
viewed segregation as per se unconstitutional; Vinson, Reed, and Clark appeared
ready to reaffirm Plessy; Jackson worried about the political question doctrine as a
possible barrier to judicial involvement; Frankfurter shared Jackson's concerns).
34. Elman History, supra note 31, at 824-25.
35. Id. at 840.
36. Id.
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in Elman's judgment was "just plain wrong as a matter of
constitutional law" because it denied relief to individuals after a
finding that their personal constitutional rights had been
violated. 37 However, the indefensible was essential in Elman's
view, and in the Court's as well, because it enabled the Court to
establish the principle of racial equality and to reject Plessy
without having to face the consequences of an immediate order
directing the desegregation3 9of the public schools.35 In Elman's
words, it "broke the logjam."
The role of the "deliberate speed" formulation (the phrase
was before the Court in briefs by 1953, well before the decision in
Brown I came down)4" provides a basis for reassessing two aspects
of the Brown 11 decision. If, as Elman suggests, members of the
Court well understood both the likely intransigence of the South
and feared the Southern backlash that a more expeditious remedy
would have triggered,4 then perhaps remedial weakness played an
essential role in securing Brown's statement of principle in the
first place. That should not excuse the Court's failure to follow
through on the promise of school desegregation; denial of any
remedy to those whose rights had been violated remained
indefensible throughout the early 1960s, just as it had been at the
time of the decision.42 But it does cast a different light on the
Court's failure to take more meaningful steps to secure Brown's
implementation. The Court's inaction may have been the implicit
price of the decision to push ahead with the invalidation of Plessy's
rule of segregation as it applied to public schools.
If the Court had resigned itself to a period of inaction in the
wake of Brown, it may be worth reevaluating the scholarly
portrait of a Court surprised by the sharpness of the Southern
reaction and impotent to secure social change. Several members of
the Court apparently believed that Congress should take the lead
role in rooting out segregation in the South. ' 3 That appears to
37. Id. at 827.
38. Id. at 830.
39. Id.
40. See supra text accompanying note 29.
41. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 736-44 (describing the deliberative process in
Brown I and the concern with implementation).
42. See KLARMAN, supra note 8, at 362-63 (discussing the use of legislative
action to accelerate the process of school desegregation).
43. A conference at Howard University in 1952 focused on "The Courts and
Racial Integration in Education." In a talk entitled "Can Courts Erase the Color
Line?" John P. Frank assessed the Court's role in shaping national policy. Frank
recounted the history of segregation in the Supreme Court, noting an 1873 decision
that invalidated segregation on statutory grounds and the 1896 decision in Plessy
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have been Justice Jackson's view.44 Elman does not expressly
attribute a similar view to Justice Frankfurter, preferring to
describe his mentor and friend as a skillful champion of the cause
of desegregation.45 According to Elman, Frankfurter engineered a
series of delays that kept the Court from reaching Plessy during
the early 1950s, and portrayed these moves as driven by his
doubts about the views of his colleagues." Frankfurter may have
shared to some extent the views of Vinson and Jackson about the
need for legislative primacy, and may have felt (as Elman did) that
the issue had been presented to the Court prematurely. 7 For at
least some of the Justices, then, the deliberate speed formulation
may have served to create space for the legislative response that
finally appeared in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Brown I decision was an essential feature in clearing the
way for the legislative response that eventually arrived. Plessy
remained a powerful and enduring symbol of the legitimacy of
racial apartheid in the South.4 8
Not only did Southerners
frequently draw on Plessy in defending segregation as the law of
the land, but even responsible Northern legislators might have
fairly doubted the power of Congress to deploy the remedial

that switched positions and upheld the practice. Frank concluded from this history
that the Court was following dominant opinion on both occasions:
The transformation suggests the inherent limitation on the judicial
process as a maker of basic social policy. On the ultimate questions of
policy, courts have a way of accommodating the Constitution to what the
country will tolerate. And yet the judicial process is more than a mere
echo of popular demand; for the judges help to make the symbols by which
the country lives.
Plessy v. Ferguson was thus at once both an
acquiescence in, and a spur to, the growing practice of segregation.
John P. Frank, Can The Courts Erase the Color Line? 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 304, 305
(1952).
My thanks to Elaine Gehrmain for bringing this conference to my
attention. John Frank's account may nicely describe Brown, a decision that both
echoed popular opinion and provides a potent symbol by which the country lives.
44. At oral argument, Justice Jackson noted his assumption that the plaintiffs
had come to court because Congress had failed to intervene. See POWE, supra note
7, at 47.
45. See Elman History, supra note 30, at 831-32 (describing Frankfurter's
central role in delaying the timing of Brown and in the June 1953 decision to set
the cases for reargument); cf. id. at 841 (noting Jackson's preference for legislative
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and describing Frankfurter as "torn").
46. For example, Frankfurter believed that the libertarians (Black and
Douglas) would rather dissent from a decision reaffirming Plessy than actually
overturn Plessy and confront the question of Southern resistance. See id. at 839.
47. See POWE, supra note 7, at 44 (noting Frankfurter's concern with timing);
see also Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1946, 1952 (1987) (describing
Frankfurter as attracted to Jackson's view that Congress should take the lead
through the exercise of its powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
48. Cf. Elman History, supra note 30, at 828-29 (discussing the Justices'
concern with the social consequences of overruling Plessy).
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powers of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a
regime of racial segregation that Plessy had proclaimed to be
entirely consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.49 Section 5,
as the Rehnquist Court has been at pains to remind us in recent
years, does not empower Congress to rewrite the Fourteenth
Amendment but only to carry into effect its terms as the Court has
previously defined them. Brown thus serves both as a symbol of
the legal claim of African-Americans to equality of treatment
before the law,5" and as the constitutional foundation for a more
active enforcement role on the part of Congress. 1 Or, as Justice
Jackson had reportedly explained in the run-up to Brown, he
wished that the Court could simply erase the Plessy precedent
from the U.S. Reports, without having to say whether it was
rightly or wrongly decided. 2 However impractical, such an
approach would at least have cleared the way for legislative
involvement of the kind Jackson preferred.
The traditional story of "deliberate speed" as the profound
betrayal of Brown rs promise may thus deserve some
reconsideration. Perhaps the deliberate speed formula enabled
the Brown Court to reach a unanimous decision to reject Plessy
that would have otherwise eluded the Court altogether. Perhaps
deliberate speed helped to secure both the constitutional principle
and the popular support that later helped to spur the passage of
the 1964 civil rights legislation. Perhaps deliberate speed gave the
American people an opportunity to consider the claim of equal

49. These doubts shaped the nature of the eventual response. When Congress
took steps to desegregate places of public accommodation in Title IL of the Civil
Rights Bill, it did so in the exercise of its commerce power and did not expressly
rely upon its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, except as to places where
discrimination was supported by State action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000b (2000); see
generally GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 201-03
(13th ed. 1997) (discussing Congress's decision to rely on the commerce power to
enact civil rights legislation); cf. RICHARD C. CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HEART OF ATLANTA MOTEL AND MCCLUNG CASES 5-7, 13
(2001) (describing the efforts of some in the Johnson administration to base the
public accommodation legislation on an expansive theory of state action that would
have reached private conduct). Similarly, the provisions most directly related to
education, those in Title VI that prohibited discrimination by recipients of federal
funds, were based upon the spending power. See ROSENBERG, supra note 8,at 4748 (discussing how complete compliance with desegregation laws became a
requirement for schools to receive federal funding).
50. Cf. Frank, supra note 43, at 316 (discussing what makes a legal victory
meaningful).
51. Cf. Elman History, supra note 30, at 841 (discussing judicial preference for
legislative enforcement).
52. See POWE, supra note 7, at 46-48 (discussing Justice Jackson's concern with
the political and social ramifications of overruling Plessy).
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educational opportunity on the merits and to reject Bull Connor's
fire hoses and German shepherds. In short, perhaps remedial
thinness played a role in securing the articulation of an
increasingly thick principle of equality. If true, we may have some
reason to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Brown If even as we
remain sober-minded about the costs of remedial thinness to
generations of school children.
II. Brown and Loving: Comparative Remediation
Before we accept the claim that the Court could imagine the
Brown decisions only by restricting their remedial implications,
however, we should consider alternatives. The Court's handling of
interracial marriage provides one possible point of comparison.
Litigants in Alabama and Virginia sought to challenge the
constitutionality of "anti-miscegenation" statutes in the immediate
aftermath of Brown. But the Court refused to hear the cases of
Jackson v. Alabama5" and Naim v. Naim, " accepting the
government's advice in the latter case that the issue was not
properly presented on the record." The Court's diffidence was
driven not by the technical presentation of the issue but by the
Justices' perception that the South was simply not prepared for
the invalidation of its interracial marriage laws. 6 The Court

53. Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S.
888 (1954).
54. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
55. The Court ducked the case twice. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955)
(remanding case to Virginia's supreme court); Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1955)
(reaffirming its prior decision upholding the constitutionality of Virginia's
miscegenation law); Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1955) (dismissing appeal from
Virginia's reaffirmance).
Elman described the Court's action here as an
unprincipled decision to duck a potentially explosive constitutional question. See
Elman History, supra note 30, at 46-47.
56. The evidence tends to support the claim that the Court deliberately
declined to reach the merits of the interracial marriage controversy. For one thing,
the Plessy decision contained language that described as obviously constitutional
the states' power to adopt such laws. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 ("[Llaws
forbidding the intermarriage of the two races ... have been universally recognized
as within the police power of the State."). Brown I disavowed Plessy, but only in
limited terms. Thus, Brown I based its decision on the sense of inferiority that
segregation fostered in its victims, and ruled that separate but equal has no place
in public education. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Then came its treatment of Plessy:
rather than flatly overruling that decision, the Brown I Court explained that any
language in Plessy contrary to this finding is rejected. Id. Such a limited statement
invites the conclusion that other aspects of Plessy might survive, to an uncertain
extent. Moreover, the Court had also ducked the interracial marriage issue on two
other occasions. In 1954, six months after the Brown I decision, the Court denied
certiorari in a case from Alabama that presented the issue. See Jackson, 72 So. 2d
at 116. Again, in its 1964 decision in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964),
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ducked the question in 1954 and 1955, only to take it up twelve
years later in Loving v. Virginia.57 In Loving, of course, the Court
voted unanimously to overturn interracial marriage restrictions."
Despite the fact that the Court in 1955 apparently regarded
interracial marriage as a more explosive issue than desegregated
schools,59 the remedy it fashioned in Loving was extraordinarily
effective. The Court simply invalidated the Lovings' criminal
conviction, and declared the law unconstitutional. 60 The decision
pretty much ended interracial marriage restrictions once and for
all. No subsequent decisions arrived at the Court's docket. In the
lower courts, much the same thing occurred. A federal district
court invalidated Delaware's law against interracial marriage,
citing Loving.61 But the matter had been pending in the district
court at the time Loving came down and did not present a question
of post-Loving intransigence.62 No other post-Loving issues arose
in the state or federal courts.6 3 In comparative terms, one might
conclude that Loving adopted a far more effective remedial
formula than Brown.
One might attribute the success of Loving to a simple change
in the times. Perhaps the country was prepared to accept the
invalidation of laws against interracial marriage by 1967, and that
acceptance created a climate of compliance. Perhaps the Court
was wrong to have dodged the Naim case as an initial matter,
the Court declined to reach the constitutionality of the South's interracial marriage
laws, preferring to base its decision on a direct challenge to a statute that made the
punishment for co-habitation out of wedlock differ depending on race. Id. at 196.
57. 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
58. See generally Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical
Assessment and Personal Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229 (1998)
(describing the Lovings' successful challenge to the Virginia prohibition against
interracial marriage).
59. For evidence of the issue's potential explosiveness, consider the fact that the
interpositionist James Kilpatrick darkly predicted that Brown might one day lead
to the invalidation of "a State's power to prohibit interracial marriage." POWE,
supra note 7, at 59; see also PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 5-6 (describing one
Alabama senator's warning that desegregationists ultimately seek to "open the
bedroom doors of our white women to black men" and quoting fears of Southerners
that racial mixing the schools would lead to mixed marriages).
60. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
61. See Davis v. Gately, 269 F. Supp. 996 (D. Del. 1967) (invalidating
Delaware's statute banning interracial marriage and citing Loving); cf. Dick v.
Reaves, 434 P.2d 295 (Okla. 1967) (upholding the validity of an interracial
marriage, notwithstanding state law to the contrary, as an incidental issue in a
dispute over an intestate's estate and citing the decision in Loving).
62. Davis, 269 F. Supp. 996.
63. See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional
Right to Marry, 1770-1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289 (1998) (discussing Supreme Court
post-Loving cases involving the right to marry).
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misjudging the depth of Southern attachment.
Perhaps the
combination of civil rights legislation and the rise of new Southern
politicians in the years between Brown and Loving had prepared
the way for acceptance of the Loving pronouncement. Whatever
one's explanation, Loving may represent an example of a situation
in which the Court was able to achieve an important change by
judicial decree. With a single stroke, the Court wiped away the
laws of sixteen states and did so without triggering the backlash
that so many had predicted." Today, few would doubt that the
nation has accepted the Court's conclusion as to the
constitutionality of interracial marriage.65
To be sure, one might try to minimize the significance of the
Court's accomplishments in Loving. In contrast to Brown, the
Loving decision did not require objecting Southerners to enter into
interracial
relationships;
it
simply
de-criminalized
the
partnerships that some Southerners voluntarily arranged on their
own. Unlike Brown, where the Court had prohibited segregation
but had largely failed to achieve any results for ten years,66 the
Loving case did not insist on changing the behavior of those
opposed to racial mixing. It simply made interracial relationships
lawful for those committed to them, and left society free to come
around.
So long as the South officially tolerated interracial
marriages, white supremacists were free to declaim against the
loss of racial purity and moderate opinion was free to express
polite dismay at the hard life faced by those who would cross the
color line in the name of love.
With these limits on the reach of its remedial principle,
Loving's approach may help to shed light on the limited remedial
ambition of the deliberate speed formulation adopted in Brown H.67

64. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
65. See John Hart Ely, If At First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next
Time? Group Harm in Brown v. Board of Education and Loving v. Virginia, 15
CONST. COMMENT. 215 (1998) (working out a problem of constitutional theory but
treating the rightness of Loving as clear beyond any doubt).
66. See ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 49-54 (arguing that it was not until the
passage of civil rights legislation that desegregation became more rapid).
67. Many observers may question the aptness of the suggested comparison of
Loving and Brown, and I thank Professors Goodwin Liu, Gerald Rosenberg, and
Daria Roithmayr for sharing their questions with me. Brown, as I suggest in the
text, required some affirmative action by unwilling parties to achieve the goal of
integration, whereas Loving created a right that courts could more easily enforce
through review of criminal convictions, or through injunctive relief against any
discriminatory denial of a marriage license. This more ready enforceability may
appear to explain why Loving's implementation followed with little controversy,
and may explain why some question the relevance of the Loving experience to the
Brown problem. But perhaps Loving's more ready enforceability helps us to re-
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During the Court's deliberations in Brown 1I, Justice Hugo Black
proposed a narrow decree, one that would order the admission of
the plaintiffs in the Brown cases to the schools of their choice but
that would refrain from addressing broader issues of segregation. 5
Justice Black understood that such a remedy would have little
immediate impact on the make-up of many Southern schools,
especially those in the deep South.69 But Black's approach would
have defined the remedial aspirations of the Brown decisions in
terms that the federal courts might enforce. That was Black's
goal:
to accept the Court's inability to achieve widespread
integration by judicial decree and to frame a remedy that
coincided with the actual scope of judicial power. 0 Imagine a
simple order that directed admission of the plaintiffs to the local
school of their choice and forbade state and local governments
from using race as a factor in the administration of public
schools.7" Federal courts might have enforced such a rule through
oversight of school board
decisions, at least where those decisions
72
used race as a factor.
Rather than directing the admission of the plaintiffs, as the
Court had done in previous cases involving litigants who
challenged their exclusion from graduate and professional schools,
Brown II directed a "start" to the process of desegregation but did
not order the immediate admission of the plaintiffs.73 In ordering
their admission on a racially non-discriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed, Brown II seemingly countenanced delay until
admission could be worked out as part of a larger system-wide
plan to secure desegregation.
The Court emphasized the
inevitability of a "transition" period 74 during which school boards

imagine the way the Court defined the rights of African-American students in the
Brown decision. Perhaps greater attention to remedial issues in Brown II could
have articulated rights that the federal courts could more readily enforce.
68. KLUGER, supra note 22, at 738.
69. Id. at 742-43.
70. Id. at 743.
71. Such an approach was eventually adopted after much foot-dragging in
Orleans Parish. There the district court simply ordered that all students were to
be admitted to either the White or African-American school of their choice nearest
their homes, and that any school transfer rules were to be administered without
regard to race. See Bush v. Orleans Parish, 187 F. Supp 42, 45-46 (E.D. La. 1960).
72. A major drawback of Justice Black's approach was its apparent reliance on
a cumbersome case-by-case approach, focusing on the claims of individuals rather
than treating the plaintiffs as members of a class. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at
743 (describing Black's preference for treating the plaintiffs as individuals rather
than as representatives of a class).
73. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (BrownI/), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
74. Id. at 299.

2006]

ORDINARY REMEDIES

would face a host of difficulties and might have to consider such
factors as physical plant, school transportation, and district
boundaries in considering how to achieve compliance." Rather
than a test the lower courts could apply in measuring school board
progress, the Court invited the lower courts to consider whether
the action of the local authorities "constitutes good faith
implementation" of the governing constitutional principles." With
the "principles" so loosely stated, and with all the facts and
circumstances declared relevant, the use of a "good faith" standard
appears to have acknowledged the inevitability of recalcitrance
and backsliding.
The Court's approach to the problem of reforming the laws
that governed school admission policies offers an especially
revealing example of the Court's willingness to tolerate delay. In
the course of describing the various matters that the school boards
would likely consider in shaping a plan for desegregation, and the
various problems that might require "additional time" after a
"start" has been made, the Court included a reference to the
"revision of local laws and regulations."77 The reference operates
less as an invitation to the lower courts to invalidate all local laws
that use race as a factor in admissions than as an invitation to the
school boards to use the need for legislative action as a
justification for further delay. Even though there was need for
comprehensive legislation in dealing with the transition to unitary
school systems, there was little prospect for securing such
legislation from Southern assemblies." The Court's reference to
law revision seemingly invites a degree of deference to the
difficulty of procuring local legislation, in apparent violation of the
rules of federal supremacy.
The plight of Virgil Hawkins, who had successfully
challenged his exclusion from the University of Florida's state-run
law school, showed the adverse effects of the Court's temporizing. 9
Although prior decisions in the professional school cases had
ordered prompt admission upon a finding that an AfricanAmerican had been wrongly excluded from graduate or
professional education, ° the Florida court refused to order
75. Id. at 300.
76. Id. at 299.
77. Id. at 300-01.
78. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966).
79. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956).
80. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (ordering admission to the
University of Texas Law School); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
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admission, claiming that Brown had switched to a remedial
framework of gradualism.8'
Although the Supreme Court
repeatedly reversed the Florida high court, it did not grant relief,
and Mr. Hawkins eventually gave up on a career in law
altogether. 2
To be sure, one cannot assume that the adoption of an
immediate admission formulation would have resulted in more
widespread integration during the troubled years of massive
Southern resistance 83 and extreme indifference by the Eisenhower
administration.84 Moreover, such an approach would have placed
the burden entirely on the African-American community to secure
integration through a process of application. 5' Doubtless such
applications would have been met with any number of pretextual
rejections (not to mention violence and intimidation), just as they
were under the school choice and pupil placement plans that
emerged."6 African-American applicants would have been forced to
challenge such rejections in the courts and to demonstrate that the
school board's asserted need to preserve neighborhood schools or to
group students at similar levels of achievement were pretexts for
continuing discrimination on the basis of race. 87 Doubtless "White
flight" would alter the demographics of neighborhood public

351-52 (1938) (ordering admission to the University of Missouri Law School).
81. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 83 So. 2d 20, 25 (Fla. 1955).
82. See POWE, supra note 7, at 64 ("[But by then Florida had changed its
admission standards for the law school and with his wife pressuring him, he gave
up.").
83. Even Thurgood Marshall and Robert L. Carter, legal counsel for the
NAACP, praised the Court for having performed its job "brilliantly." Thurgood
Marshall & Robert L. Carter, The Meaning and Significance of the Supreme Court
Decree, 24 J. NEGRO EDUC. 397, 397 (1955).
84. See PATTERSON, supra note 20, at 81-82 (noting Eisenhower's refusal to
support the Brown decision publicly and suggesting that the judicial caution that
followed may have owed something to the perceived absence of presidential
support).
85. But cf. id. (discussing Brown ITs empowerment of federal courts to
"supervise and control desegregation of the schools").
86. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (school choice plan);
Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956) (pupil placement).
87. See Marshall & Carter, supra note 83, at 400 (asserting that under Brown
II, the burden is "on the school boards to prove to courts' satisfaction that their
programs have eliminated... enforced segregation, and not upon plaintiffs to prove
some form of segregation remains"). Although Marshall and Carter expressed
regret at the absence of any specific deadline, they recognized that nothing would
happen under the decree unless African-Americans "demand and insist upon
desegregation." Id. at 402. It would take a "long and bitter fight" but desegregation
would come only if African-Americans "exhibit real militancy and press relentlessly
for their rights." Id.
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schools, but that was precisely what occurred anyway.88 The
integration battles in Southern cities like Little Rock made clear
that the burden of integrating public schools fell with enormous
disproportion on the African-American community, just as did the
burdens of Jim Crow, Montgomery, and Selma. If the gap between
Brown's aspirations and the more sobering reality was as broad as
many had correctly anticipated, then perhaps immediate
admission was in order.
The prospect of a limited remedy of the kind Justice Black
supported in Brown II forces us to confront the chastening of
aspiration such a remedy may have entailed.
Written in
somewhat amorphous terms, the deliberate speed formula had a
protean quality that included the capacity for growth and change.89
Just as it could accommodate a period of massive resistance, the
remedial formula in Brown I could later stretch to encompass the
Court's growing impatience with the slow progress of
desegregation. ° The Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County
School Board,9 expanding the range of remedial options for
district courts and casting more affirmative obligations on
Southern school districts, was imaginable within the context of a
deliberate speed formula."
Had Justice Black's more narrow
conception of the proper scope of remedies taken hold in 1955,
however, the 1968 expansion of remedial options may have
appeared to have presented a sharper break with the remedial
assumptions of the past. A more specific statement of the Court's
remedial expectations in 1955 may have deprived its decision of
the capacity to goad some states and to confront other states with
their failure to have made any significant headway.
On the other hand, the contemplation of more limited
remedies forces us to confront the possibility that Brown If
88. See KLARMAN, supra note 8 (detailing struggle in Little Rock).
89. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
90. See Green, 391 U.S. 430 (turning away from the emphasis on negative
remedies and instead recognizing affirmative remedial obligations by focusing less
on the good faith of school officials and more on their actual success in moving from
a dual to a unitary school system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) (providing more detailed remedial guidance and approving the
use of busing).
91. 391 U.S. at 441-42. The Court's insistence on concrete steps to be taken
'now" underscored its insistence on the elimination of all vestiges of discrimination,
"root and branch." Id. at 438.
92. See id. at 435-38 (noting that the school board's freedom of choice plan had
failed to achieve the "racially nondiscriminatory school system" that the Brown II
decision required; emphasizing the board's failure to make any effort for ten years,
and contrasting that omission with Brown ITs requirement of a "prompt and
reasonable start" (quoting Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301)).
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demanded less of the South than it was capable of achieving.
Justice Frankfurter had worked to delay any decision for fear, he
said, of the possibility that the other Justices might vote to
reaffirm Plessy.93 Was that really possible? Elite opinion in the
wake of World War II had turned so sharply against Jim Crow
that one can scarcely conceive of the Court actually voting to reject
the claims of the Brown plaintiffs.94 Thurgood Marshall may have
had a surer grasp of the tide of history than did Frankfurter and
Black; Marshall's decision to press the Court for an answer
ultimately rested on the sure-footed sense that the AfricanAmerican community had waited long enough.9 Marshall knew,
perhaps better than Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, that the
process of change in the South could not really begin until the
Court overturned Plessy and the approving stamp that decision
had placed on the institution of Jim Crow.99 In that sense, his
decision to ask the Court to take the first step97 may have been the
most difficult and most praiseworthy of the many tough calls he
made as the NAACP's lead lawyer.
Just as one wonders if the Court waited too long, and
proceeded too cautiously in Brown, a sense of missed opportunity
hangs over the Loving decision as well. Given the response to
Loving when it came down, and the Court's success in establishing
the legality of interracial marriage through a simple decree," one
wonders why the Lovings of the world had to wait so long. A
moving memoir of their relationship exposes the pain they would
have been spared had the Court invalidated Virginia's laws in
Naim v. Naim.99 One cannot avoid asking if that hardship was
justified by the prudential considerations that led Justice
Frankfurter to put off the Court's consideration of the interracial
marriage issue, just as it had put off its decision in Brown.9 0
Indeed, the more conservative members of the early Warren Court
may have been projecting their own ambivalence about interracial
marriage in expressing concern with the likely Southern reaction

93. See POWE, supra note 7, at 44.
94. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Changes, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 83-84 (1994) (discussing the gradual emergence
of well-educated middle class blacks after World War II who rejected Jim Crow).
95. See POWE, supra note 7, at 39-41.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 286-300.
99. See id. at 286.
100. See POWE, supra note 7, at 71.
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to its de-criminalization.'
The timing of Loving may have had
more to do with changes in the make-up of the Court between 1955
and 19670 2 than with the Court's perception of likely Southern
reaction.
If the timing of Loving owes something to certain Justices'
own ambivalence toward interracial marriage in the 1950s, then
perhaps we should reconsider the Court's adherence to its selfimposed rule of unanimity. Justice Frankfurter was absolutely
convinced of the need for unanimity, and he persuaded Chief
Justice Warren of the wisdom of that approach in dealing with the
Jim Crow South. 1°'
Unanimity was thought essential to
strengthen the Court's message to the country, and to help to
lessen the likelihood of Southern opposition." 4 Warren has earned
high marks from historians for his work in bringing Justices
Jackson and Reed around to his views in Brown. 1" In retrospect,
the Court's unanimity did not encourage Southern acceptance of
the decision. Instead of taking up the words of a dissenting
Justice, opposition to Brown in the South simply coalesced around
the Southern Manifesto, and around the nineteenth century
doctrine of interposition as reformulated by columnist James
Kilpatrick."' Southerners proved that they were perfectly capable
of dismissing the decision as a judicial usurpation of the legislative
power without a dissenting opinion that pointed them to that
conclusion."7
If unanimity gained the Court little in terms of acceptance of
its decisions in the South, it may have taken a toll on the Court's
own decisional processes. The Court apparently split in response
to the Virginia decision in Naim, recognizing it as a direct

101. Id. at 209.
102. President Kennedy made appointments to fill positions vacated by the
retirements of Justices Whittaker and Frankfurter, thereby providing what
historians have referred to as the Warren Court's fifth vote. See id. at 209-16. Of
the nine Justices who participated in the Brown I decision in 1954, only Chief
Justice Warren, Justices Black, Clark, and Douglas remained on the bench at the
time of Loving in 1967. See id. Justices Reed, Jackson, Frankfurter, Minton, and
Burton had all left the Court. See id.
103. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 700.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See POWE, supra note 7, at 58-62 (noting initial approval by the South of
Brown II, followed by dissent and organization around the Southern Manifesto).
107. See Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d. 78, 82 (Va. 1967), rev'd, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (reaffirming the constitutionality of miscegenation laws and describing the
proposal to overturn such laws as inviting "judicial legislation in the rawest sense
of that term").
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challenge to the authority of Brown. °8
Without a rule of
unanimity, self-imposed or otherwise, the Justices may have
agreed to hear the Naim case and invalidate laws banning
interracial marriage. 1°'
But with Justice Frankfurter urging
further delay to protect Brown, and Justice Clark joining in the
view that one bombshell was enough, the Court unanimously
chose the path of avoidance."' One has to ask if the desire for
unanimity enabled certain Justices to use the possibility of dissent
to forestall consideration of the issue.
III. Brown II and the Evolution of Constitutional Remedies
The claim that Brown 11 represents a failure of the Court's
remedial authority seems hard to dismiss. The decision seems to
admit the inevitability of Southern resistance and to acknowledge
that no real change would soon occur in the make-up of public
schools. One can see this acceptance of the inevitable clearly
expressed in a paper by Professor Alexander Bickel, writing on the
occasion of the tenth anniversary of Brown.'
Bickel viewed the
period of massive resistance and the absence of widespread
integration with a measure of equanimity."' The important point
was to establish the legal principle of equality before the law and
access to public schools without regard to race."' Only then could
the federal courts begin to take up the task of administering or
implementing the right through the issuance of more effective and
far-reaching remedies." 4 Even so, Bickel viewed the federal courts
as incapable of accomplishing more than they did during the first
decade."'
Bickel stated two reasons for the inevitable remedial
failure."6 One connects to his famous concern with the countermajoritarian difficulty, which led him to question the legitimate
scope of the Court's role in interpreting the Constitution."'

108. See POWE, supra note 7, at 71-73.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 71-72. See generally Elman History, supra note 30, at 845-47.
111. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation:Progressand
Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964).
112. See id. (declaring that Bickel is both encouraged by the prospects of the
future but also outraged by the token compliance since Brown II).
113. Id. at 194.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 216 ("No judicial remedy.., could conceivably work any wonder, even
small ones....").
116. See id. at 196-201.
117. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-
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According to Bickel, the Court cannot expect general acquiescence
every time it makes a pronouncement about an issue of deep
concern to broad segments of society.11 Rather, the Court must
expect a period of opposition and non-compliance." 9 To Bickel,
that was the lesson of the Lochner era, and he applied the same
lesson to the Southern resistance to Brown."° Bickel thus rejected
criticisms of the "deliberate speed" formula; rather than a
capitulation in the face of anticipated resistance, the formula
operated as a candid recognition of the Court's limitations. 2 ' As
he concluded, the remedial consequences would have been the
2
same "no matter what the form of the Supreme Court's decree. 2
A second point underlaid Bickel's acceptance of Southern
resistance. Bickel understood the array of remedies available to
the Court in constitutional cases to be quite limited.' 23 As he
described the system of remedies, the enforcement of judge-made
constitutional law had been left to private initiative. 4 Moreover,
the system of remedies as he understood it operated "prospectively
only, so that no penalties attach to failure to abide by it prior to
completion of a judicial proceeding seeking enforcement. " 1 25 As a
practical matter, the prospective operation of the remedial system
gave every officer in the South the freedom to act at variance with
the new constitutional order. On Bickel's view, "no one is under
an obligation to carry out a rule of constitutional law announced
by the Court, until someone else has conducted a successful
litigation and obtained a decree directing him to do so."" 6 In the
meantime, individuals were free to agitate against the acceptance
of the Brown principle and act in violation of it without
consequence.'7 While the Court might have proclaimed its own
supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron, proclamations did not make it so.121
Bickel's account of the remedial foundation of the Court's
inability to change Southern society by judicial decree invites us to

23 (1962).
118. See Bickel, supra note 111, at 196.
119. See id. (arguing disagreement is both legitimate and relevant but will
nonetheless cause delay).
120. See id. at 196-98.
121. See id. at 198-99.
122. See id. at 201.
123. See id. at 198-99.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 199.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 198 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
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consider whether the federal courts would offer the same limited
range of judicial remedies for constitutional violations today. This
part examines that question. Setting to one side the rise of the
structural injunction, which has been a much-discussed outgrowth
of desegregation litigation, 129 this part looks at the growth of less
celebrated judicial remedies for civil rights violations in the years
since Brown If. In a host of ways and along a variety of
dimensions, public officials would enjoy much less freedom today
to await the federal enforcement actions than Bickel described in
his account of Brown If. The second section of this part considers
the implications of this change in remedial potency. Brown's
principle has led to the recognition of remedial options well beyond
those imaginable at the time Brown II articulated its formula of
deliberate speed.
A. Remedial Changes Since Brown II

Many of the federal judicial remedies for violations of
constitutional law that we take for granted today were unavailable
at the time of Brown I. Without specifying each of the changes in
exhaustive detail, this section briefly summarizes the expansion of
remedies that has occurred in the past fifty years. In many cases,
as this section shows, the expansion of remedial options occurred
in litigation over the enforcement of civil rights-litigation that
frequently forced the Court to confront the inadequacy of the state
courts.
1. Damage Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs
At the time of Brown 11, the law of federal remedies did not
include a routinely available right of action for money damages
resulting from a constitutional violation. A short time later, in its
1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,'3° the Court recognized the
availability of a claim under § 1983 for official actions taken under
color of state law that violate the Constitution.13' As the Court
concluded, the statute provides a remedy both for unconstitutional
state statutes, customs, and policies, and for the actions of state
129. Compare William Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional
Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982) (focusing on the
legitimacy of the remedial discretion exercised by trial courts in institutional suits)
with Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
949 (1978) (expressing skepticism about the use of structural reform litigation to
effect institutional change).
130. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd sub nom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S.

658 (1978).
131. Id. at 171-72.
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and local government officials that violate state and federal law.'
By construing the statute to provide a federal remedy, even where
the state law also prohibited the action in question and state
courts were available to entertain the claim, the Court sidestepped
any requirement that individuals exhaust state remedies as a
prelude to § 1983 litigation." The decision represented, as Justice
Frankfurter noted in dissent, a major departure from the usual
assumption that "the state courts, not the federal courts, would
of that fundamental security of
remain the primary 1guardians
34
person and property."

The recognition of a damages claim for constitutional torts
fundamentally alters the calculus of state and local government
officials. Unlike the situation that Professor Bickel described at
the time of Brown, such officials can no longer ignore federal
constitutional law with impunity and await the issuance of a
decree naming them as defendants. Rather, such officials must
consider the possibility that they may face individual liability for
the violation of constitutional rights. To be sure, doctrines of
official immunity shield officers from liability except in
circumstances where they have violated clearly established
rights.'
But in many instances where Southern officials
deliberately flouted the dictates of Brown, it would have been
possible to show a violation of clearly established law.
Of course, one can question the effectiveness of a damages
remedy from a variety of perspectives. Such a remedy may not
have altered the behavior of Southern politicians who promised
segregation now, and segregation forever. The right to trial by
jury that attaches to such proceedings under § 1983 would have
placed the ultimate decision in the hands of jurors who may have
faced a good deal of pressure to nullify the constitutional rights of
the plaintiffs through a defense verdict. 136 Difficult valuation
problems would have certainly arisen had any case gone to trial
that required juries to reckon the cost to African-Americans of
132. Id. at 173-74.
133. The importance of the Court's non-exhaustion ruling became clear a few
years later. See McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 674-75 (1963) (permitting
individuals to sue to enjoin a segregated school system without requiring them first
to exhaust available administrative remedies in an Illinois case arising that failed
to present massive resistance overtones).
134. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 237 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
135. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1982).
136. See Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 709-10 (1999) (concluding
that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury attaches to a § 1983 action
against a governmental entity for effecting a regulatory taking; emphasizing the
claim for monetary relief as the key to determining the scope of the jury trial right).
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their exclusion from integrated public schools." 7 Yet despite these
difficulties, and many more, the availability of a damages remedy
may have altered the calculus of Southern officials bent upon
obstructing the enforcement of Brown. Assuming the articulation
of a set of clear legal expectations on the part of the Court,
intransigence may have resulted in personal liability for the
executive branch officials responsible for massive resistance.
2. Actions to Stay State Court Proceedings
At the time of Brown, the federal courts followed a fairly
strict policy of avoiding any entanglement in pending state court
criminal proceedings. Under the long-standing Anti-Injunction
Act, 13 courts of the United States may not grant injunctions to
stay state court proceedings except as authorized by an act of
Congress, where necessary in aid of jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate the federal court's judgments." 9 The Supreme Court
had announced a fairly demanding approach to an earlier version
of this statute in its 1941 decision in Toucey v. New York Life
Insurance Co.,"' ruling that judge-made exceptions to the ban on
anti-suit injunctions were disfavored.14 ' In the wake of Toucey,
and the statute's recodification in 1948, lower federal courts were
left to debate whether § 1983 might be seen as authorizing the
issuance of injunctive relief against state court proceedings that
were apparently brought to frustrate or impede the constitutional
rights of African-Americans. Two early decisions rejected anti-suit
injunctions on the merits, 14' and two more reasoned that § 1983 did
137. The task of valuing dignitary interests in constitutional tort litigation has
proven somewhat vexed. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (fashioning
a federal common law rule to measure damages owed in connection with a state
official violation of procedural due process); cf. Memphis Comm. Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (rejecting a jury instruction that had invited
valuation based upon the historic value of the constitutional right at issue and
holding that damages must compensate for injuries actually suffered rather than
constitutional rights abstractly infringed). But cf. Bogel v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347,
1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a substantial verdict based upon testimony as
to the dignitary and emotional injuries suffered as a result of an unlawful racebased transfer). To some extent, the award of an attorney's fee to prevailing
parties under § 1983 ensures that violations of constitutional law do not go entirely
unpunished, even where as suggested in Carey, they may produce only nominal
damages. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 ("[T]he denial of procedural due process should
be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury.").
138. See 28 U.S.C. 2283 (2000).
139. See Id.
140. 314 U.S. 118 (1941), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. 2283, as recognized in
Missouri v. U.S. Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981).
141. Id.
142. See Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Tribune Review
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not qualify as an express grant of authority to issue injunctions
and could not be seen as overriding the provisions of the AntiInjunction Act."'
These limitations on the power of the federal courts to issue
injunctions against flagrantly unconstitutional state court
proceedings left African-Americans and other civil rights activists
to raise their constitutional claims in the state criminal justice
systems. "4 Consider the case of the Freedom Riders:... officials in
Jackson, Mississippi arrested hundreds of freedom riders for
violating local laws that required the segregation of facilities in a
bus depot. " 6 Although some sued successfully to enjoin future
arrests under a patently unconstitutional statute, state officials
did not treat the federal decision as decisive of the constitutional
issue in state court criminal proceedings."'
Many of those
arrested simply acquiesced in state criminal sanctions; others
litigated through all levels of the Mississippi court system without
success, only to have their convictions summarily reversed by the
Supreme Court. " 8 Doubts as to the availability of a federal
remedy against pending state criminal proceedings may have
persuaded the litigants that state court criminal processes were to
be exhausted and ultimate relief sought in the Supreme Court. " 9
Today, the Court has expanded the availability of § 1983 as a
source of authority for federal courts to enjoin pending state
0
criminal proceedings. In the decisive case, Mitchum v. Foster,1
the Court held that § 1983 provided the district courts with
Publ'g Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
143. See Smith v. Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957) (finding that § 1983 does
not provide an express grant of authority to issue anti-suit injunctions); Island S.S.
Lines, Inc. v. Glennon, 178 F. Supp. 292 (D. Mass. 1959).
144. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting
Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 796-97 (1965)
(describing the use of state criminal justice systems to attack lawful
demonstrations in support of civil rights).
145. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS

1954-63, 451-91 (1988).
146. See id. at 474-75.
147. See Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962), on remand, 206 F. Supp. 67
(S.D. Miss. 1962) (denying injunctive relief), reversed, 323 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1963)
(ordering entry of injunctive relief against future arrests two years after the
freedom rides of 1961).
148. See Thomas v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965) (per curiam).
149. See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 452-53 (1927) (reversing an
injunction against pending prosecutions but affirming the grant of an anti-suit
injunction against any future state court prosecutions for constitutionally protected
activity).
150. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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authority, in an appropriate case, to grant injunctive relief. '
Although the Court has carefully circumscribed the availability of
such relief and has made it clear that the federal structure of the
government requires respect for state court primacy in the
handling of criminal proceedings, 5 ' the Court has approved antisuit injunctions in certain kinds of civil rights cases.'
Although
the rules that govern the interplay between federal actions for
injunctive relief and state criminal proceedings have grown more
complex over time,' civil rights plaintiffs are still able to seek
relief in federal court against the threat of prosecution for
engaging in constitutionally protected activities. 55
3. Expansion of Class Action Treatment for Civil Rights
Litigation
As of the date of Brown II, the original version of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed class action practice
in the federal courts."' Borrowed from equity practice, the civil
rules divided multiparty litigation into three categories: true,
hybrid, and spurious class actions.'
According to Professor
Moore, true class actions involved parties whose joint interest
would have required joinder of their common claims in any case;
hybrid class actions involved claims to a particular property
interest; and spurious class actions involved the common claims of
151. Id. at 242 (stating that "Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to
issue injunctions in § 1983 actions" in order to fulfill the purpose of § 1983).
152. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971) (generally prohibiting the
issuance of injunctions to stay state court criminal proceedings, but recognizing
exceptions for prosecutions conducted in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment
and those that seek to enforce a flagrantly unconstitutional state statute).
153. See Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489 (1965) (concluding that a civil
rights group could seek to enjoin prosecution under two Louisiana statutes that
threatened the group's members with prosecution for subversive activities; noting a
pattern of threats and intimidation that justified immediate relief).
154. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (requiring federal court
deference to a state criminal proceeding initiated after the filing of the federal
action but before the federal court had conducted proceedings of substance on the
merits).
155. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (upholding the power
of federal court to grant preliminary injunctive relief against state prosecution in
cases threatening irreparable injury and in which the plaintiff is likely to prevail
on the merits); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974) (upholding the power
of federal court to entertain an action for declaration of rights to engage in
handbilling free from the threat of arrest and prosecution).
156. See Joel Seligman & Lindsey Hunter, Introduction, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 407,
407-08 (1997) (noting that Rule 23 was originally adopted in 1938 and not revised
until 1966).
157. See 3B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T123.30 (2d ed.
1948).
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individuals whose claims might overlap on issues of law or fact but
who were viewed as bound only to the extent their interests were
actually brought before the court. '
Class action litigation was not immediately embraced as the
procedural tool of choice in the wake of Brown 11. Although the
Brown Court treated the suits as "class actions," some lower
federal courts declined to embrace the broader forms of relief that
class action treatment would apparently have entailed.'59 By
treating the plaintiffs as individuals, litigating common claims on
an individual basis rather than as members of a class, 6 ' the courts
One leading state
played into the hands of massive resistance.'
strategy was to require African-American students to apply to the
school board for a transfer to a formerly all-White school. 162 Such
transfer decisions often took time, and often resulted in the denial
of the application.' 63 Class action treatment might have facilitated
a speedier challenge to such laws, cutting through the ordinary
rule that individuals must exhaust their administrative remedies
before bringing suit to challenge administrative action.

158. See id. For further discussion of Rule 23 as it stood around the time of
Brown 11, see Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 877, 929-33 (1958), noting, in part, that "there has been
an almost complete acceptance by the courts" of Moore's labels.
159. See, e.g., Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95, 98 (4th Cir. 1959)
(finding that parents who fail to appear and submit to interrogation by the Board of
Education did not exhaust the remedies provided by state statute and therefore
could not appeal to the federal courts); Beckett v. Sch. Bd., 185 F. Supp. 459, 461
(E.D. Va. 1959), affd sub nom. Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960)
(holding that the Pupil Placement Board's policy of denying all applications of
African-American children for placement in predominantly White schools violates
equal protection and due process). See generally Note, The Federal Courts and
Integration of Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962) (discussing the evolution of federal court attitudes
toward pupil placements acts; noting the typical requirement of exhaustion before
federal court class action review and unconstitutionality as an exception to the
exhaustion requirement).
160. See, e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956); cf.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372, 384 (N.D. Ala. 1958)
(upholding a pupil placement law that required consideration of individual
applications for admission against a facial challenge).
161. See Note, The Federal Courts and Integration of Southern Schools, supra
note 159, at 1453 (stating that individual-based pupil placement statutes made
mass integration almost impossible, placed burdensome procedures on individual
black students, and established vague standards that made it difficult to prove that
an individual denial was based on race).
162. See Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race,
Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 171214 (1997) (describing the use and workings of pupil placement laws as a more
successful strategy than massive resistance for preventing school desegregation).
163. See id.
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Eventually, the federal courts began to embrace such uses of the
class action, as they moved away from the token integration
associated with the early pupil placement plans."
In 1966, Rule 23 was amended to regularize class action
practice in civil rights litigation. Rule 23(b)(2) was specifically
designed for the civil rights class action where "the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class," thereby making relief appropriate for the
"class as a whole." 6 ' The associate reporter of the new rule, Albert
Sacks, had served as an instructor at legal training sessions for
NAACP lawyers,'66 and the official account of the rule change
makes clear its desire to foster civil rights litigation.'67 Since the
changes took effect, and no doubt due in part to a more favorable
body of underlying substantive law, class action litigation has
become the tool of choice for challenges to school segregation,
employment discrimination, and prison conditions. 65 It provides
an important procedural predicate for structural reform litigation.
M

4. Relaxation of the Abstention Doctrines in § 1983 Cases
At the time of the Brown I decision, the Supreme Court often
required litigants who wished to challenge the constitutionality of
state law to pursue state court remedies if an interpretation of
unsettled state law could provide an alternative basis for relief.
The leading case, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,169
arose as a challenge to the constitutionality of a state agency
164. See Carl Tobias, Public School Desegregation in Virginia During the PostBrown Decade, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1261, 1278-79 (1996).
165. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2).
166. See Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Mean of
Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 575, 577 (1997) (describing the role of Albert
Sacks).
167. See 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966) (illustrating the application of Rule 23(b)(2) by
referring to actions in the "civil rights field, where a party is charged with
discriminating unlawfully against a class"). Of course, a rule change may look out
of place on a list of judge-made remedies for the violation of constitutional rights.
But as the drafters of the rule were at pains to point out, Rule 23(b)(2) follows the
lead of several decisions that expanded class treatment in school desegregation
controversies. See id. (listing numerous appellate court decisions finding a proper
class action in school desegregation and public accommodation cases).
168. See Greenberg, supra note 166, at 577-85; see also Abram Chayes, The Role
of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976)
(describing the growth of litigation beyond two private parties to larger social
questions in which the trial judge has become "the creator and manager of complex
forms of ongoing relief;" specifically noting school desegregation, employment
discrimination, and prisoners' rights cases as examples of this new type of
litigation).
169. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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decision that discriminated against African-American railroad
employees." ° Justice Frankfurter held that the district court
should not have reached the merits, but should have stayed the
litigation pending a state court determination of the legality of the
agency's action under state law. 17' As Frankfurter explained, in a
decision that clearly reflected his consistent desire to put off any
head-on consideration of the continuing vitality of Plessy, state
courts might avoid the constitutional issue by adopting an
interpretation of the state statute that blocked the agency's action
on state law grounds.' 2 At the height of massive resistance, the
Court refused to treat § 1983
as an implied exception to the
7
Pullman abstention doctrine.'
Pullman abstention represented a major obstacle to the
ability of civil rights plaintiffs to challenge the many new laws
that Southern legislatures adopted to frustrate the Brown I
decision. As Justice Douglas explained, concurring in one such
case, African-American litigants subjected to Pullman abstention
might soon find themselves in state court, facing a journey that
"may be not only weary and expensive but also long and drawn
out."' 4 This journey through the state court was required by
Pullman's insistence upon a sure-footed reading of state law, one
that only the state's supreme court could provide. Only after
obtaining a determination of the state law issue, and only after
preserving their right to return, could the federal plaintiffs revive
the federal proceeding and seek a ruling there on the
constitutional question. 17 5
Pullman abstention played an
aggravating role in complicating the NAACP's attempt to defend
itself from Virginia's attempt to regulate the organization out of
existence.'76
While Pullman abstention remains a potential source of
delay today, its effects have been ameliorated somewhat by more
170. See id. at 497-98.
171. See id. at 501.
172. See id.
173. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority's application of the abstention doctrine; arguing that the
doctrine is especially inappropriate as applied to civil rights cases and that "the
federal courts are the unique tribunals which are to be utilized to preserve the civil
rights of the people").
174. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 435 (1964)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
175. See id. at 428.
176. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 417-19 (1963) (describing the six years
of jockeying in state and federal courts that preceded the Court's decision
upholding the NAACP's claim to immunity from disclosure of its membership lists).
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recent developments. Many states provide for the certification of
questions of state law directly to the state's supreme court. 177 Such
certification procedures provide a mechanism for obtaining the
more sure-footed reading of state law that Pullman abstention
seeks to precipitate. Moreover, the Court itself has suggested that
the availability of such certification procedures, and the need to
178
avoid undue delay, should play a role in the abstention calculus.
These changes, coupled with developments that foreclose federal
plaintiffs from seeking injunctive relief on state law rights of
action,'79 have reduced the likelihood of Pullman abstention.
5. Expansion of Remedies Against Local Governments and
School Boards
Along with the expansion in the availability of § 1983
remedies against government officials, the Court has expanded the
scope of municipality liability. It was not at all obvious at the time
of Brown I that § 1983 provided an action for damages, let alone
an action against local government entities like counties, cities, or
school boards. In Monroe v. Pape,8' the Court authorized suits
against individual government officers but rejected municipal
liability, concluding that local government entities were not
"persons" within the meaning of the statute. 18 Several years later,
the Court overruled this aspect of Monroe, holding that
governments were proper defendants in § 1983 actions. 1812 In doing
so, the Court made clear that governments were not liable on a
strict theory of respondeat superiorfor the torts of their employees,
but bore responsibility only for injuries inflicted as a result of the
government's official policy or custom.'
Such a remedy subjects government entities, at the local but

177. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State
Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 159
(2003) (noting that some form of certification to the state's highest court is
available to federal judges in forty-seven states).
178. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76-79 (1997)
(holding that the lower court erred in reaching the merits of the state constitutional
law issue instead of certifying the question).
179. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars the federal district courts from
entertaining actions to compel state officials to comply with state law). Under
Pennhurst, plaintiffs will have fewer occasions to identify state law grounds that
might trigger Pullman abstention by federal courts.
180. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
181. See id. at 191-92.
182. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
183. See id. at 694.
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not state level, 8 4 to liability for policies both written and
unwritten, official and informal. 8 ' This new remedy could reach
both the formal rules and regulations that Southern school boards
adopted in the administration of pupil placement and other
programs, as well as the informal rules that such entities adopted
as part of a practice of massive resistance or intransigence. The
Court has cut back on the scope of § 1983 somewhat, limiting to
some extent what constitutes a policy that will subject government
units to liability; 86 but these limits would not affect the
availability of damages for policies
designed to evade the
87
recognition of constitutional rights.
6. Expansion of the Capacity to Secure Enforcement of
Constitutional Rights
As remedial schemes have grown more potent, the capacity of
individuals to mount effective challenges to state and local
government activity has also improved. Individuals may turn to
the federal government for enforcement; the government's role in
the enforcement of constitutional rights at the state and local level
has grown dramatically in the years since Brown I. The federal
government may institute criminal proceedings against individual
state and local officials for violations of civil rights and may bring
civil actions to end a pattern or practice of constitutional
violations. 88 The Attorney General may intervene in pending civil
184. The Court has held that states are not subject to liability under § 1983. See
Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989).
185. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (noting that local governments can be sued
for unconstitutional customs "even though such a custom has not received formal
approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels").
186. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 414 (1997)
(concluding that the requisite degree of deliberate indifference had not been shown
to justify finding the county responsible for the actions of a deputy later involved in
the use of excessive force); St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130-31 (1988)
(concluding that lower level officials do not fashion policy for the city government
within the meaning of § 1983).
187. See Bd. of County Comm'rs, 520 U.S. at 404; Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
188. As for criminal sanctions, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (2000), which proscribe
a conspiracy to injure or oppress any citizen in the free exercise of rights and
privileges secured by the Constitution and any act that willfully deprives citizens of
such rights and privileges. As for civil proceedings, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-5(a),
2000b(a), 2000c-6(a), 2000e-6(a) (2000), which authorize the Department of Justice
to initiate civil actions to end a pattern of resistance to the exercise of rights to
public accommodations, to desegregate public facilities, to desegregate public
schools, and to end employment discrimination, respectively. The most recent
addition to the Department of Justice's pattern or practice authority declares it
unlawful for any law enforcement agency to engage in a pattern or practice of
depriving persons of their constitutional rights and empowers the Attorney General
to bring a civil action to challenge such patterns or practices. See 42 U.S.C. §
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rights litigation, moreover, to advance the government's own views
about the enforcement of the rights at issue."' In addition to
petitioning the federal government, individuals may approach an
increasing number of more and less well-funded legal services and
non-profit organizations that define their mission as the
enforcement of constitutional rights."' The rise of litigationminded non-profit groups, modeled to some extent on the NAACP's
Legal Defense Fund and the ACLU, expands the likelihood that
individuals who suffer constitutional violations can find
organizations willing to press their claims.
B. Implications of the Court's Expanded Arsenal of
OrdinaryRemedies
It would be a mistake to suppose that the growth in the
arsenal of ordinary remedies has fundamentally transformed the
power of the Court to change American society.
Political
opposition to the Court's decisions remains a fact of life, and one
can see the impact of conservative religious opinion on the shape
of such opposition today."' The school prayer decisions remain
controversial,192 as does the suggestion that the Constitution
forbids any reference to God in the pledge of allegiance."' The
prospect of same-sex marriage has produced a host of political
responses at the state level,"' and Congress has enacted
14141(b) (2000). For an account of this provision, see Eugene Kim, Vindicating
Civil Rights Under 42 U.S.C. § 14141: Guidance for Procedures in Complex
Litigation, 37 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 767 (2002).
189. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000e-5(f) (2000) (authorizing the Department
of Justice to intervene in civil actions brought by private parties to enforce rights
under the public accommodations and employment titles of the Civil Rights Act,
upon a certification that the case is of general public importance).
190. See, e.g., Robert J. Rhudy, Comparing Legal Services to the Poor in the
United States with Other Western Countries: Some Preliminary Lessons, 5 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 223, 245-46 (1994) (noting that the United States "has
seen an explosion of single-purpose nonprofit organizations which can retain legal
counsel to represent client concerns within their subject areas").
191. See, e.g., Michael P. Farris, FacingFacts: Only a ConstitutionalAmendment
Can Guarantee Religious Freedom for All, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 689, 692 (1999)
(describing opposition from conservative religious groups to Justice Scalia's opinion
in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
192. See Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe Independent
School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) ("Religion in public schools has long been a
subject of intense controversy in our country and from all appearances will remain
so for a long time to come. Among the various ways that religion might interject
itself in schools, there is none more volatile than the issue of school prayer.").
193. See generally Charles J. Russo, The Supreme Court and Pledge of
Allegiance: Does God Still Have a Place in American Schools?, 2004 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 301 (2004).
194. See Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Fashioning a Tolerable Domestic Partners
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legislation to foreclose federal judicial consideration of the limits
on interstate enforcement of same-sex marriage under the Defense
of Marriage Act.9
But the expanded arsenal of ordinary remedies for
constitutional violations suggests that the federal courts no longer
occupy the same position of remedial weakness that Bickel viewed
as compelling the adoption of something like the deliberate speed
approach of Brown I. Litigants today may go to federal court to
seek injunctive and declaratory relief against the proposed
enforcement of unconstitutional state laws, and need not rely upon
the state courts in the first instance. 96 Litigants may also seek an
award of damages both against the responsible officials and
against the governmental entity itself in many instances. 197 Just
as the extraordinary powers of the federal courts in institutional
reform litigation have expanded dramatically in the last fifty
years, so too have their ordinary remedial tools.
It thus becomes possible to consider a narrower, and perhaps
more effective, decision in Brown I1. Rather than an invitation to
gradualism and resistance, the Court might have insisted on
prompt admission of the plaintiffs to the school of their choice and
a prompt end to the maintenance of segregated schools. Such a
narrow, rights-based approach had been included among the
remedial options that the Court considered in setting reargument
for Brown I1.1 It opted instead, as critics have noted, for a regime
of reliance on federal courts as the monitors of school board
compliance that brought us the period of institutional reform
Statute in an Environment Hostile to Same-Sex Marriages, 7 L. & SEXUALITY 55,
62-65 (describing various state actions, including statutes prohibiting same-sex
marriage and constitutional amendments).
195. See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); see also Jill R.
Green, Will the Marriage of Dick and Jane Evolve into the Marriage of Jane and
Jane? Same Sex Marriage: A Viable Union in the 21st Century, 45 LOY. L. REV.
313, 328 (1999) (discussing the provisions and purposes of the Defense of Marriage
Act).
196. There has long been an exception to abstention and other doctrines
preventing federal intervention when the petitioner could show that an irreparable
injury would be caused by the state prosecution. See Doran v. Salem, 422 U.S. 922,
931 (1975). The power to intervene was broadened after Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965), but has since been limited. See Note, Federal CourtIntervention in
State Criminal Proceedings, 85 HARv. L. REV. 301, 301 (1971). For an extensive
discussion of Dombrowski and its progeny, see Frank L. Maraist, FederalInjunctive
Relief Against State Court Proceedings:The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 535 (1970).
197. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (authorizing suit against government
officials acting under color of law); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at 658,
663 (1978) (authorizing suit against municipal governments as such).
198. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.13 (1954).
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litigation. 9' That era has just about come to an end, at least for
school desegregation, and scholars still cannot agree as to whether
the federal courts played a useful role. Certainly the problems of
segregated housing patterns and segregated education remain
largely unremedied. °°
Some chastening of judicial ambition may have come to
inform the Court's more recent forays into the articulation of new
201
constitutional rights. Lawrence v. Texas may provide a case in
point. More like Loving than Brown I, Lawrence discerns a liberty
interest in the due process clause that immunizes sexual conduct
in the privacy of one's home from criminal sanctions. °2 One
supposes that the Court will have few occasions to police its newly
articulated right, or to consider the constitutionality of new state
laws adopted by offended state legislatures who wish to resist the
Court's decree. Criminal sanctions will quietly disappear from the
statute books. But on one reading, the Lawrence Court stopped
short of attempting to integrate gays more completely into
American life, and short of any indication that gays have a
constitutional right to marry one another. °3 Instead of building
deliberate speed into its remedial formula, the Lawrence Court
temporized through the issuance of a decree that specified what
may prove to be a thin constitutional right."°4
Conclusion
Brown II stands as a symbol of delay and gradualism and has
rightly attracted the criticism of those who suspect that the Court
could have done more to stand up to Southern resistance. This
Essay suggests that the Court might have overcome gradualism
and resistance with a more concrete decree that clearly stated the

199. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 380 (1992) (noting
the "upsurge in institutional reform litigation" since Brown 1).
200. See Danielle R. Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation Trend
in Our Public Schools, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1085, 1086-87 (2004) (discussing
current trend toward resegregation in United States schools); Robert Westley,
Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 40
B.C. L. REV. 429, 440 (1998) ("Housing segregation ... remaints] dismally high.").
201. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
202. See id. at 578.
203. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. ("The present case ... does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter."). But see David D. Meyer, Domesticating
Lawrence, 2004 U. CI. LEGAL F. 453 (suggesting reasons why the Lawrence
rationale may not be so easily confined).
204. The Court announces a very narrow and specific privacy interest, defining
its holding as much by what it does not say as by what it does. See id.
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right of individual students to admission to the schools of their
choice. The Court actually considered a decree of this sort, but
chose instead the vague terms that Southerners understood as an
invitation to delay. Perhaps that outcome was inevitable; Elman's
account of the Court's deliberations suggests that the "deliberate
speed" formula, as an alternative to immediate admission, played
a decisive role in securing a unanimous Court in Brown I. If so,
then as much as we may regret the unprincipled gradualism of
Brown 11, we might embrace it as the price of securing the
enduring principle of equality in Brown I.
Brown 11 might deserve another backhanded compliment. If,
as Alexander Bickel argued, the federal courts were in no position
to insist on implementation of the Brown principle in 1955, fifty
years later we find the federal courts at least a bit more fully
armed. Remedies have evolved dramatically in fifty years, and
federal courts may insist more emphatically on compliance with
the Court's dictates. Many of these changes owe something to the
civil rights revolution of the 1960s and the perceived need to open
the federal courts to the enforcement of constitutional rights.
Legal analysts can criticize the litigiousness that has accompanied
the rights explosion of the past fifty years, but society often
benefits when it channels opposition into federal litigation and
away from violent resistance. By helping to provide federal courts
with a set of tools to address constitutional violations, Brown II
has done its part to deepen the nation's commitment to the rule of
law. Popular constitutionalism, to a surprising degree, now often
takes place in the courtrooms.
No one understood better than Thurgood Marshall that the
enunciation of the equality principle in Brown was only the
beginning of the struggle to end school segregation in the United
States. Marshall explained that it would take relentless pressure
by African-Americans to make the promise of desegregation a
reality. Even then, as Marshall explained, desegregation would
move at its own pace, quickly in some places, and more slowly in
others. But in the end, in words that seem to be a fitting summary
of Brown H, the principle would triumph, and desegregation would
"come eventually to all."2 °5

205. Marshall & Carter, supra note 83, at 403.

